I’ve written before how we often judge whether or not a decision was “good” or “bad” based on the results. A good decision can have bad results and a bad decision can have good results. The decision Pete Carroll made in Super Bowl XLIX to throw on second-and-goal has been widely excoriated as a really bad decision because it resulted in an interception that sealed New England’s victory. However, it was actually a good decision that had a really bad result because of poor play by Russell Wilson and good play by New England’s defensive backs.

First, let’s analyze the situation and the call. After a first-down run of 4 yards, the Seahawks had three plays to gain one yard. While that sounds simple “on paper,” it can be very difficult, especially at the one-yard line. Take a look at the sideline view…

Much has been made of Marshawn Lynch’s (Seattle’s running back) success on 3^rd/4^th downs with short yardage needed. But a running play at the goal line faces additional obstacles. On a short-yardage play at midfield, the defense still has to protect the field behind them in case of a breakthrough by the runner. At the goal line, the defense must only protect the line of scrimmage. All the open space of the end zone is irrelevant on a running play. This allows the defense to charge forward with abandon—if the runner gets past them, it’s over. So a running play is not a “gimme” at this point on the field.

With three plays remaining to try to score, 26 seconds remaining in the game, and one timeout, what are Seattle’s options? If they run and do not score, they must call a timeout. They will then get only one more play if a run, thus “wasting” their fourth down try. You may recall Coach Carroll saying later they were “wasting” their second down play. This is what he meant…

If Seattle just chooses to try to run, they will not get a fourth down (scenario #1), assuming they do not score on either of their two runs. But look at the second two sequences. If they run on 2^nd down and do not score, then they must call a timeout, and then they must pass on 3^rd down or risk scenario #1. An incomplete pass on 3^rd down (assuming no TD) stops the clock and then allows them to choose a run or pass to win the game. In that scenario, the defense knows exactly what is coming on 3^rd down, a much riskier time to pass the ball.

Scenario #3 offers a much more attractive sequence. A pass attempt on 2^nd down offers the hope of a touchdown, or an incomplete pass, or a complete pass without scoring, in which case they are back to scenario #2. An incomplete pass allows them to save their timeout and they can then choose a run or a pass on either of their next two downs, keeping the defense guessing.

And, it’s not like they called a risky pass. That simple slant to the middle with a rub (pick) on the outside almost never gets intercepted. (Don’t tell Kurt Warner that, though.) But, because of a poor decision by Wilson and outstanding play by New England, along with a bit of a penalty, the worst happened and the Patriots are going home as champions.

Here’s the sideline view before the snap. Seattle WR Lockette is going to run a “slant” route inside toward the goal line. Seattle WR Kearse is going to push New England safety Browner back into cornerback Butler, thus “rubbing” him out of the play. Unfortunately for Seattle, NE was prepared for exactly this play and Butler has already made an adjustment. Butler is too deep to be “rubbed.” He recognizes the alignment Seattle is using and sets himself deep, keeping him away from the attempted pick by Kearse.

Here’s the play as it begins to form and it’s already breaking badly for Seattle. Browner is winning the battle against Kearse and not allowing himself to be driven backward. Butler has already reacted to the play and is making a beeline to intersect with Lockette in front of the goal line. Now, even though this is not working out for the Seahawks, it is still not a terrible play. Most of the time, this would just be an incomplete pass, or maybe a completion but short of the goal line.

The problem here is Wilson. Look at Wilson’s line of sight and remember that he is shorter than the “average” QB. He cannot see Butler! He sees Lockette breaking open into the middle of the field, just as designed, but he has to assume the pick play by Kearse is working because he’s not tall enough to see over the linemen and see Butler charging toward the route. Notice how the defensive linemen are keeping upright and together as they rush, not giving Wilson any “throwing lanes” to see and throw the ball. (You’ll also notice there is nowhere for Lynch to have gone on a run.)

This is what Wilson sees as he releases the ball. Again, he cannot see Butler as his view is obscured. Also, because he has no throwing lane and he’s a little shorter, can can’t “zip” the ball to the receiver, he has to lob it over the linemen. He also makes a big mistake—he “leads” Lockette with the ball into the end zone. He should have thrown the ball a little behind or right to the receiver where he’s open. But he can’t see Butler charging the play, assumes the pick worked (as you can see, Butler is already around the pick), and tries to score the TD rather than take a “safe” throw.

Here’s the pass as it arrives to Lockette (and Butler). From this front view, you can see how Wilson throwing the ball in front of Lockette put it right into the arms (and hands) of Butler. It’s also clear from this view that Butler interfered with Lockette. Yes, I know he was “playing the ball,” but he clearly runs into Lockette (and sends him literally flying through the air backward a couple of feet) before the ball arrives. I think the officials were correct in not calling the penalty (they often err on the side of “let them play” this late in a big game), but, still, Butler got away with a penalty on this play.

So, Pete Carroll made a good call. But New England was ready for this exact play, reacted superbly to it, and Russell Wilson made a bad throw. A good idea. Just bad result.